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THE EXCEPTION OF NOERR-
PENNINGTON MATERIALS FROM
DISCOVERY UNDER THE PETITION
CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Parties that jointly attempt to influence government action,
either by petitioning the government or by commencing or sup-
porting litigation, are provided with immunity from the federal an-
titrust laws' under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.' Under Noerr-
1 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (1985). The Sherman Act provides in part that "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
§ 1.
Public outcry over monopolistic business practices led to a broad political consensus
favoring government regulation. See JOHN J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REG-
ULATION 90-91 nn.336-37 (1964). Prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, 26
states had enacted their own individual antitrust laws. Id. Federal action was prompted
when it became clear that most state regulations were unenforceable on constitutional
grounds and inadequate for purposes of uniformity. See id. at 10-14 (tracing growth of fed-
eralism and subsequent defeat of state antitrust laws on constitutional grounds); EARL W.
KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 9-10 (2d ed. 1973) (viewing federal antitrust regulation as
cure to complexities and confusion of state regulation).
Although many of the state laws were aimed at elementary forms of monopoly or inter-
ference with free trade, some might be considered true precursors to the Sherman Antitrust
Act. See id. at 8-9. In fact, one of the purposes cited by Senator Sherman for his bill was to
"supplement the enforcement of" the state laws. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890), reprinted in 1
State Antitrust Practice and Statutes, ABA ANTITRUST SEC. 20 (1990).
The federal antitrust statutes are much broader than those based on the common law of
the states, and include provisions prohibiting unlawful contracts, combinations and conspir-
acies in restraint of trade, monopolization and attempts to monopolize, and unfair methods
of competition. See THOMAS V. VAKERiCs, ANTITRUST BASICS § 1.01, at 1-2 to 1-3 (1992).
The primary rationale behind all antitrust regulation is the belief that the laws serve to
protect the economy from the abuses inherent in monopolization. See DOMINICK T. AR-
mENTANo, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL 9 (1986). Monopoly is the antithesis of
the much valued notion in America that competition in business will lead to greater busi-
ness efficiency. See id.; see also MARSHALL C. HOWARD, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION 1
(1983) ("Basic public policy toward business in the American economy has been to promote
and maintain competition as the most desirable means of allocating resources."); VAKERICS,
supra, § 1.01, at 1-2 ("[U]nrestrained competition will result in the most favorable alloca-
tion of economic resources and the lowest prices possible.").
2 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is the product of three seminal cases decided by the
Supreme Court from 1961 through 1972: California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlim-
ited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); and
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). See
James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Government Processes, The First Amendment, and the Bound-
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Pennington, such activities are protected, even if part of a larger
scheme of anticompetitive conduct.3 This exclusion from the anti-
trust laws is founded primarily on the First Amendment right to
petition the government.4
Parties that have engaged in activity protected by the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine 5 have argued that discovery into these activi-
ties should not be allowed.' The principal argument why such dis-
aries of Noerr, 74 GEo. L.J. 65 (1985); see also infra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (trac-
ing development of Noerr-Pennington through case law); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Develop-
ments in the Noerr Doctrine, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 361 (1987) (explaining doctrine).
3 See California Motor, 404 U.S. at 510-11 (right of petition includes access to courts to
advocate personal business interests without violating antitrust laws); Pennington, 381 U.S.
at 670 (recognizing that "Noerr shields from Sherman Act concerted efforts to influence
public officials regardless of intent or purpose").
' See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136-38. The Noerr Court stated that even if the "essential
dissimilarity between an agreement jointly to seek legislation or law enforcement and the
agreements traditionally condemned by § 1 of the Act" was not itself conclusive on the
question of whether the Act was applicable, the question was conclusively settled when this
essential dissimilarity [was] considered along with other difficulties that would be
presented by a holding that the Sherman Act forb[ade] associations for the pur-
pose of influencing the passage or enforcement of laws[:]
In the first place, such a holding would substantially impair the power of the
government to take actions through its legislature and executive that operate to
restrain trade. In a representative democracy such as this, these branches of gov-
ernment act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept
of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes
known to their representatives .... Secondly, and of at least equal significance,
such a construction of the Sherman Act would raise important constitutional
questions. The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of
Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade
these freedoms.
Id.; see also California Motor, 404 U.S., at 510-11 (access to courts is form of right to peti-
tion which must also be protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
I See Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Ac-
tion: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Cm. L. Rav. 80, 80
(1977). The scope of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has proven difficult to define "largely
because of the variety of governmental institutions whose decisions affect private economic
interests and the diverse means that private parties utilize in attempting to influence these
institutions." Id. For example, private anticompetitive ends may be sought without antitrust
liability by "lobbying the legislature to enact a statute, petitioning the executive to enforce a
law in a certain manner, opposing the grant of a license by an administrative body to a
competitor, [or by] bringing a lawsuit against a competitor to reduce competition .... Id.
at 80-81 (citations omitted). Further complicating the determination of the exact scope of
Noerr-Pennington is the fact that the very right to petition embodied in the first amend-
ment is a "right whose boundaries remain uncertain." Id. at 81.
8 See North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 666 F.2d
50, 51 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding Noerr-Pennington merely an exemption from antitrust liabil-
ity and not a bar to discovery); Australia/Eastern U.S.A. Shipping Conference v. United
States, 537 F. Supp. 807, 808 (D.D.C. 1982) (balancing harm to First Amendment values
against need for information sought).
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covery should be prohibited is that forced disclosure of materials
produced during the course of protected activities will have a
"chilling effect" on the very petitioning process the doctrine seeks
to protect.7 The few cases addressing this issue have been inconsis-
tent in their holdings and in the focus of their inquiry.8
This Note will discuss the methods used by the courts to de-
termine whether the discovery of Noerr-Pennington materials will
be allowed and under what circumstances. Part One will examine
the trilogy of Supreme Court decisions creating this doctrine. Part
Two will discuss the inconsistent decisions addressing the applica-
tion of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as a bar to discovery, and
7 See Carolina Power, 666 F.2d at 53; Australia/Eastern, 537 F. Supp. at 808-09.
"[T]here is no doubt that the overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that forced
disclosure of first amendment activity creates a chilling effect which must be balanced
against the interests in obtaining the information." Id. at 810.
8 See Carolina Power, 666 F.2d at 52. In Carolina Power, the Fourth Circuit held that
Noerr-Pennington did not apply to discovery. Id. In Australia/Eastern, the District Court
for the District of Columbia criticized the Carolina Power court's casual dismissal of the
doctrine's applicability as a bar to discovery, refusing to read that case "to stand for the
proposition that the harm to first amendment values attendant upon forced disclosure of
Noerr-protected conduct should, not be weighed against the interests favoring disclosure."
Australia/Eastern, 537 F. Supp. at 809. A similar balancing test has been employed by sev-
eral courts to determine the admissibility of Noerr-Pennington-protected evidence at trial.
See Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.7 (5th Cir. 1978)
("Admissibility... should be governed by a test that weighs the probativeness of and the
plaintiff's need for the evidence against the danger that admission of the evidence will
prejudice the defendant's first amendment rights."); Lamb Enter., Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co.,
461 F.2d 506, 516 (6th Cir. 1972) (deferring to trial judge's decision not to admit Noerr-
Pennington-protected evidence where prejudicial effect outweighed probative value).
Authority for admitting Noerr-Pennington-protected conduct into evidence at trial
stems from the Pennington case itself:
It would of course still be within the province of the trial judge to admit this
evidence, if he deemed it probative and not unduly prejudicial, under the "estab-
lished judicial rule of evidence that testimony of prior or subsequent transactions,
which for some reason are barred from forming the basis of a suit, may neverthe-
less be introduced if it tends to show the purpose and character of the particular
transactions under scrutiny."
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670-71 n.3 (quoting Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705 (1948)).
Still other courts have avoided the issue of whether or not the doctrine may be used in
and of itself as a bar to discovery by coupling the applicability of the doctrine as a bar to
antitrust liability with other relevant rules of discovery and admissibility. See In re Burling-
ton Northern, Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 523-32 (5th Cir. 1987) (doctrine as possible bar to discov-
ery in conjunction with traditionally recognized attorney-client and work product immunity
exemptions from discovery), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988); City of Cleveland v. Cleve-
land Elec. Illuminating Co., 538 F. Supp. 1257, 1279 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (plaintiffs barred
from inquiry designed solely to trigger admission of doctrine-protected conduct unless de-
fendants first "open the door" by introducing such privileged conduct in defending suit).
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suggest that the proper focus is not the applicability of the doc-
trine to discovery matters, but rather a case by case evaluation of
whether a party's First Amendment right to petition outweighs its
adversary's interest in obtaining discovery. Finally, Part Three will
propose a refinement to this balancing approach as suggested in a
recent New York district court decision.
I. THE NOERR-PENNNGTON DOCTRINE
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc.,9 a group of trucking companies brought suit against a
number of railroads, a professional railroad association, and a pub-
lic relations firm, alleging that the defendants violated the Sher-
man Act by conspiring to monopolize the long-distance freight
business. 10 The plaintiffs alleged that the railroads hired the public
relations firm to conduct a smear campaign against the trucking
industry in order to eliminate it as a competitor.1" Specifically,
plaintiffs charged that the smear campaign had succeeded in per-
suading the Governor of Pennsylvania to veto a bill that was
favorable to the trucking industry.1 2 Plaintiffs asked that the de-
fendants be restrained from attempting to exert any more pressure
on the Governor or the legislature in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy.' 3
The Supreme Court utilized a three-pronged rationale 4 in
holding that the Sherman Act "does not prohibit two or more per-
sons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legis-
lature or the executive to take particular action with respect to a
law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly."' 5 First, the
Court noted that the association of the railroads and the public
relations firm bore little resemblance to the combinations normally
held violative of the Sherman Act.' 6 Second, the Court stated that
9 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
10 Id. at 129; see also supra note 1 (discussing Sherman Act).
1 See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129-30.
12 Id. at 130. The bill in question was known as the "Fair Truck Bill," which would
have given truckers an advantage in the long-distance freight industry by permitting trucks
to carry heavier loads over Pennsylvania roads. See id.
13 Id. at 130-31.
14 See id. at 136-38.
10 Id. at 136.
10 See id., 365 U.S. at 136. The Court reasoned that combinations in restraint of trade
were "ordinarily characterized by an express or implied agreement or understanding that
the participants will jointly give up their trade freedom, or help one another to take away
1098 [Vol. 66:1095
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a representative democracy depends upon the ability of the people
to make their wishes known to their representatives, and that to
impute a congressional intent to regulate political activity, as op-
posed to business activity, by restricting public access to these rep-
resentatives had no basis in the legislative history of the Sherman
Act.17 Finally, the Court stressed the right of the people to petition
the government under the First Amendment18 and refused to im-
pute any congressional intent to invade this freedom with the pas-
sage of the Sherman Act.19
The Court stated that even if a party intended an anticompe-
titive result in its campaign to influence the legislature, such con-
duct was not within the scope of the Sherman Act.20 The Court,
however, recognized that the imposition of antitrust liability would
be justifiable if the effort to influence governmental action was a
mere "sham" calculated to obscure an attempt to interfere directly
with a competitor's business.21
The doctrine was developed further in United Mine Workers
the trade freedom of others through the use of such devices as price-fixing agreements, boy-
cotts, market-division agreements, and other similar arrangements." Id. (citations omitted).
17 See id. at 137.
'8 U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." Id. (emphasis added).
19 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38.
20 Id. at 143-44.
21 Id. at 143-44. In Noerr, there was no issue as to whether or not the railroads had
made genuine attempts to influence legislation; thus, the anticompetitive motives behind
such efforts were not violative of the Sherman Act. Id. at 144.
Parties have been uniformly unsuccessful in attempting to categorize legislative peti-
tioning activity as a sham. See Milton Handler & Richard A. De Sevo, The Noerr Doctrine
and its Sham Exception, 6 CARDozo L. REV. 1, 18 (1984). It has been suggested that "the
only evidence that would demonstrate impropriety would be in the [antitrust defendant's]
own admission that his [legislative petitioning activities] were undertaken in bad faith." See
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW % 203a, at 40 (1978). Only in the
judicial forum, with its higher and more objective standards for such abuses of process, have
parties been successful in breaking through the protection of Noerr-Pennington. See Sulli-
van, supra note 2, at 362-63.
Unlike the infinite possible objectives of legislative petitions, adjudication occurs
within bounds fixed both by existing statutes and, to some extent, by the prece-
dents of the tribunals involved. Such boundaries may provide administrative [and
judicial] criteria for determining whether the defendant used adjudication in good
faith. Thus, the bad faith or "sham" exception to Noerr immunity can be more
readily applied here than in the legislative context.
AREEDA & TuRNER, supra 203b, at 41. However, even in an adjudicatory context, it is
difficult to discern the existence of a "sham". See id. T 203b, at 42.
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v. Pennington.2 In Pennington, the partners of a small coal min-
ing company sued trustees of the United Mine Workers of America
(UMW), alleging that attempts by UMW and certain large coal op-
erators to influence the Secretary of Labor to establish a higher
minimum wage in the mining industry were part of an illegal con-
spiracy to eliminate the competition of smaller coal companies. 23
The Court found reversible error in the trial judge's failure to in-
struct the jury that "[j]oint efforts to influence public officials do
not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate
competition. '24 Thus, the Court reemphasized that an anticompe-
titive purpose does not affect the legality of the act itself. 25
In 1972, the Supreme Court extended Noerr-Pennington in
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited28 to in-
clude certain activities beyond attempts to influence the legislature
or the executive branch.27 In California Motor, the defendant mo-
tor carriers allegedly monopolized trade in the transportation of
goods by instituting administrative and judicial proceedings in op-
position to the plaintiffs' applications for motor carrier operating
rights in California.2 The Court extended the right of petition pro-
tected in Noerr and Pennington to include the rights of groups
with common interests to "use the channels and procedures of
state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and
points of view. ''29
22 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
11 Id. at 659-61. The Walsh-Healey Act requires all parties under contract with any
branch or agency of the United States government to pay their employees no less than the
minimum wage as determined by the Secretary of Labor. 41 U.S.C. § 35(b) (1978). This
restriction applies to parties that for the manufacture or furnish materials valued in excess
of $10,000. Id. In Pennington, the smaller mining company alleged that UMW and several
large coal companies had violated the Sherman Act by successfully petitioning the Secretary
of Labor to raise the minimum wage for employees of contractors selling coal to a govern-
mental agency, thus making it more difficult for the smaller companies to compete for sales
of coal to that agency. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 660.
24 Id., at 670.
25 Id.
26 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
27 Id. at 510-11.
28 Id. at 509.
29 Id. at 510-11. In discussing the First Amendment right of all citizens to petition the
government, the Court noted that this right extends to all three branches of government. Id.
at 510. Thus, while Noerr concerned itself with the legislative branch, and Pennington with
an official of the executive branch, California Motor necessarily included administrative
agencies and the judicial system within the scope of the First Amendment right of petition.
Id.
Although traditionally raised as an exemption from antitrust liability, Noerr-Pen-
1100 [Vol. 66:1095
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The Court, however, recognized that the adversarial nature of
administrative and judicial proceedings may give rise to frequent
allegations of baseless litigation,30 which would make it difficult for
the presiding court or agency to draw a line between genuine litiga-
tion and anticompetitive abuse of the judicial or administrative
processes.3 1 While no precise standards were provided to alleviate
this burden, the Court made it clear that "a pattern of baseless,
repetitive claims" is an abuse of process. 3 2
nington has been extended to protect First Amendment petitioning of the government from
claims brought under non-antitrust laws. See, e.g., Video Int'l Prod., Inc. v. Warner-Amex
Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[A]ny behavior by a
private party that is protected from antitrust liability by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is
also outside the scope of section 1983 liability."), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906 (1989); Evers v.
County of Custer, 745 F.2d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying Noerr-Pennington as de-
fense to section 1983 claim); Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1344-45
(7th Cir.) (applying Noerr-Pennington and "sham" exception to section 1985 conspiracy
suit), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977).
30 See California Motor, 404 U.S. at 513.
31 See id.; see also AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 21, 203b, at 42 (application of
"sham" test difficult to apply in administrative or judicial context); Fischel, supra note 5, at
122 (applying Noerr-Pennington problematic due to ambiguous basis for doctrine); Earl W.
Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust Exemptions for Private Requests for Governmental
Action: A Critical Analysis of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 549,
553 (1984) (discussing problem of drawing line between sham and legitimate governmental
petitioning).
31 California Motor, 404 U.S. at 513. Many courts have interpreted this language as a
mere example of when a court might reasonably determine the existence of "sham" litiga-
tion, and not as a prerequisite to such determination. See Thomas A Balmer, Sham Litiga-
tion and the Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 39, 49-56 (1980) (citations omitted). Other
courts have held California Motor to require repetitive "sham" suits as a prerequisite to
antitrust liability. Id. at 54 (citations omitted). It has been suggested that the legislative
intent behind the Sherman Act justifies the prohibition of a single "sham" suit under the
rationale that "[a] single, well-timed, and carefully pleaded suit, with appeals, can cost a
potential competitor large amounts of money and time, even if the suit is completely frivo-
lous." Id. at 49, 56.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit held that the California Motor Court actually identified
two distinct types of "sham" activity: "'misrepresentations ... in the adjudicatory process'
and the pursuit of 'a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims.'" Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.
v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1529 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct 1557 (1992). Under Columbia Pictures, a plaintiff alleging
"sham" litigation must satisfy a two-prong test- "(1) that the suit is baseless ... ; and (2)
that the suit was brought as part of an anticompetitive plan external to the underlying
litigation ... ." Id. at 1532. Thus, "[w]hen the antitrust plaintiff challenges one suit and not
a pattern, a finding of sham requires not only that the suit is baseless, but also that it has
other characteristics of grave abuse, such as being coupled with actions or effects external to
the suit that are themselves anticompetitive." Id. at 1530 (emphasis added) (citation omit-
ted). Consequently, a single successful lawsuit alone is protected by Noerr-Pennington re-
gardless of anticompetitive intent, and "it cannot be a sham as a matter of law." Id. at 1530-
31.
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I. THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE AND DISCOVERY
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 26(b)(1),
"[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pend-
ing action."33 Thus, the scope of discovery is very broad, and infor-
mation can be obtained regarding any matter that is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as long
as such information is not privileged. 4
Privileged information refers to the formal privileges as recog-
nized under the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE") 5 Under FRE
In direct contrast, the Fifth Circuit has rejected the argument that a successful lawsuit
can never be a sham. See In re Burlington Northern, Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988). According to the Burlington court, "the determinative
inquiry is not whether the suit was won or lost, but whether it was significantly motivated
by a genuine desire for judicial relief." Id. (emphasis added); see also Warner-Amex, 858
F.2d at 1083 (reaffirming Burlington holding that even successful petitioning activity can
constitute "sham").
33 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
U See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET" AL., CIVnL PROCEDURE § 7.2, at 381 (1985) (discussing
broad scope of discovery under Federal Rules and in state practice).
Discontent with our system of discovery was expressed recently at the American Bar
Association's 1990 Annual Meeting in Chicago, where lawyers, judges, professors, and clients
universally agreed that abuse of discovery practice has rendered "[t]he Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure's promise of the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action' at
best, a hollow incantation and, at worst, a cruel joke." See Loren Kieve, Discovery Reform,
A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 78, 80. Pre-trial arguments about "the scope of discovery, privilege,
protective orders, the length (and place) of depositions, and so on" result primarily in the
generation of more billable hours rather than the enlightenment of the litigants as to the
merits of their respective cases. See id.
s5 See FED. R. EviD. 501. Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or politi-
cal subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they might be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an ele-
ment of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
privilege... shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Id.
Article V, as submitted to Congress by the Supreme Court, included proposed Rules
which listed specific non-constitutional privileges that the federal courts must recognize. See
H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7082;
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7058-
59. The list afforded privileged status to traditionally recognized privileged communications
between lawyer-client, husband-wife, and psychotherapist-patient. See id. Congress, how-
ever, eliminated all of the Court's specific Rules on privileges with the enactment of Rule
501. See id. Under FRE 501, privileges were to be governed by principles of the common law
as interpreted by the federal courts, except in the case of an element of a civil claim under
1102
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501, it is the common law, as "interpreted... in the light of reason
and experience," that will determine the privileges applicable in
federal question and criminal cases, while privileges in diversity ac-
tions will derive from state law.36
In the context of antitrust litigation, evidence of Noerr-Pen-
nington activity may be relevant to show that the conduct falls
within the sham exception.3 7 In addition, under Pennington, evi-
dence of protected activity may also be admissible, within the dis-
cretion of the trial court, to the extent it tends to show the purpose
or character of other non-protected activity.3 8 Assuming that mate-
rial produced in the course of Noerr-Pennington activity is other-
wise discoverable, the extent to which this material should be pro-
tected becomes an issue.
The courts agree that Noerr-Pennington, standing alone, does
not create a privilege against discovery within the meaning of
FRCP 26." The possibility of a chilling effect on the right to peti-
tion, however, necessitates restrictions on the broad scope of dis-
covery under the federal rules.40 Consequently, there is apparent
conflict among the courts regarding the proper test to be applied in
determining whether discovery into Noerr-Pennington activities
should be allowed.4'
In North Carolina Electric Membership Corp. v. Carolina
state law, in which any relevant privilege was to be governed by the common law of the
state. See id. The rationale behind this change is to prevent federal law from superseding
state law in substantive areas and to eliminate incentives for forum shopping. See id.
" See FED. R. Evm. 501.
'7 See Australia/Eastern U.S.A. Shipping Conference v. United States, 537 F. Supp.
807, 809 (D.D.C. 1982); supra notes 21, 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing sham
exception).
" Pennington, 281 U.S. at 670-71 n.3 (1969); Australia/Eastern, 537 F. Supp. at 809
(discussing admissibility of evidence of Noerr-Pennington activity).
" North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 666 F.2d 50,
52-53 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Australia/Eastern, 537 F. Supp. at 808-10 (balancing of First
Amendment interest required before discovery allowed). Several courts have held that the
First Amendment interests embodied in the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, coupled with other
evidentiary privileges, will act as a bar to discovery. See In re Burlington Northern, Inc., 822
F.2d 518, 525, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1987) (attorney client privilege coupled with First Amend-
ment interest barred discovery); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 538
F. Supp. 1257, 1274-79 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (holding trial judge has broad discretion as to
admissibility under Noerr-Pennington).
40See Australia/Eastern, 537 F. Supp. at 810-811; infra notes 63-67.
41 See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (discussion of Australia/Eastern
court's criticism of Carolina Power for inadequate consideration of chilling effect of forced
disclosure on First Amendment right to petition).
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Power and Light Co.,42 an antitrust suit against several electric
utilities, the plaintiffs sought discovery of documents relating to
the utilities' political lobbying efforts.43 The defendants claimed
that these materials were protected by the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine and should thus be absolutely privileged."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that discovery was permissible, stating that Noerr-Pen-
nington was "by definition an exemption from anti-trust liability,
and not a bar to discovery of evidence. '45 The court recognized
that under Pennington, evidence of Noerr-Pennington activity is
admissible to the extent that it tends to show the character of
other non-protected activity.46 The court concluded that since evi-
dence of the lobbying activity would be admissible, it was also
discoverable.47
The court dismissed as without merit the argument that al-
lowing discovery of activity protected by the doctrine would have a
chilling effect on the First Amendment right to petition the gov-
ernment.48 Relying on Herbert v. Lando,49 in which the Supreme
Court ordered production of a planning conference memorandum
for a television news special,50 the Carolina Power court stated,
without additional explanation, that "[i]f discovery into the [edito-
rial process] would not have a chilling effect, then neither would
discovery in this case."'51
12 666 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1981). In Carolina Power, sixteen rural electrical cooperatives
sued two utility companies alleging monopolization of the electric power market in violation
of the Sherman Act. Id. at 51. Plaintiffs appealed the lower court decision, which held that
documents relating to legislative lobbying were exempt from discovery because such docu-
ments were protected by Noerr-Pennington. Id.
43 Id.
41 Id. at 51.
41 Id. at 53.
41 Id. at 52; see also supra note 8 (language of Pennington authorizing admission of
government petitioning into evidence).
41 Carolina Power, 666 F.2d at 53.
41 See id.
49 441 U.S. 153, 155 (1979). Plaintiff, a public figure, brought a defamation action
against a television network and its employees. Id.
60 Id. at 174.
' Carolina Power, 666 F.2d at 53. The Lando court, in recognizing the substantial bur-
den placed upon a plaintiff required to prove actual malice, held that the First Amendment
afforded no absolute constitutional privilege from discovery to defendants in a defamation
suit. See Lando, 441 U.S. at 169. In rejecting defendants' claim that requiring disclosure of
the editorial process would produce an intolerable chilling effect on activity protected by the
First Amendment, that Court argued that "if the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of
damages liability for publishing knowing or reckless falsehoods, those effects are precisely
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Thus, under Carolina Power, any material that is "arguably
admissible" would be discoverable, without regard for the defend-
ant's First Amendment right of petition.52 This broad scope of al-
lowable discovery has since been called into question.
In Australia/Eastern U.S.A. Shipping Conference v. United
States,53 the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, holding that discovery of Noerr-Pennington activity could
be prevented, stated that the Carolina Power decision could not be
read "to stand for the proposition that the harm to first amend-
ment values attendant upon forced disclosure of Noerr-Pen-
nington-protected conduct should not be weighed against the in-
terests favoring disclosure. ''M The court persuasively pointed to a
long history of precedent dealing with forced disclosure of activi-
ties protected by the First Amendment, and stated that the over-
whelming authority supported the principle that the harm to these
values must, in all cases, be balanced against the need for discov-
ery.55 The court criticized the Carolina Power court's selective reli-
what... [the seminal cases requiring proof of actual malice] have held to be consistent with
the First Amendment." Id. at 171.
In concurrence, Justice Powell agreed that although the initial inquiry in deciding any
discovery request was one of relevance, "when a discovery demand arguably impinge[s] on
First Amendment rights," a higher threshold of relevance may be required. Id. at 179 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring). In determining a satisfactory standard of relevance, Justice Powell
stated that a court must balance the need for First Amendment protection of the conduct at
issue against the need of the party seeking discovery of information pertaining to such con-
duct. Id.
52 Carolina Power, 666 F.2d at 53.
5 537 F. Supp. 807 (D.D.C 1982). In Australia/Eastern, the government sought recon-
sideration of the district court's exclusion of certain paragraphs from the government's Civil
Investigative Demand on Noerr-Pennington grounds. Id. at 808. The government also ar-
gued that "if the chilling effect of Noerr disclosure [was] to be considered at all, an actual,
rather than assumed, chilling effect [was] required to quash governmental inquiry." Id. at
808-09.
" Id. at 809.
" Id. at 809-10; see e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960) (chilling effect of
mandatory disclosure to board of education of all organizational associations outweighs any
legitimate state interest in the information); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960)
(ordinance requiring names and addresses of circulators of handbills to be printed thereon
unconstitutional without legitimate state interest); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466
(1958) (chilling effect of disclosure of NAACP membership lists to the State forbidden
where no compelling state interest shown).
Although Noerr-protected activities were admittedly different from the types of infor-
mation traditionally sought in the cases dealing with forced disclosure of constitutionally
protected activities, the court recognized that the individual rights afforded by the First
Amendment were of equal constitutional value, and the chilling effect on the right to peti-
tion the government was no less violative of the Constitution than a chill upon the expres-
sion of other First Amendment freedoms. See Australia/Eastern, 537 F. Supp. at 810.
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ance on Herbert v. Lando56 to dismiss the "chilling effect" argu-
ment, pointing out that even in Lando the Supreme Court made it
clear that while the balance in that case favored disclosure, the
chilling effect on First Amendment activities would prevail absent
sufficient compelling interest in disclosure.5
Under Australia/Eastern and Carolina Power, the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine clearly does not provide an absolute privilege
from discovery.58 However, Australia/Eastern supports the pro-
position that discovery may be limited when a trial court, in its
discretion, determines that the chilling effect discovery would have
on a party's First Amendment right of petition outweighs its ad-
versary's interest in obtaining discovery.59 Although courts may
disagree as to the proper weight to give each of these competing
interests,"0 Australia/Eastern dictates that only a sufficiently
''compelling" interest in disclosure outweighs the chilling effect
that forced disclosure has on First Amendment activity.61 Unfortu-
nately, the Australia/Eastern court did not provide specific proce-
dural guidelines for determining the existence of a "compelling"
interest in obtaining discovery.2
56 441 U.S. 153 (1979); see supra note 51 (discussing Lando opinion).
57 See Australia/Eastern, 537 F. Supp. at 810. Other courts have also utilized the Aus-
tralia/Eastern rationale. See e.g., Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1196
(8th Cir. 1982) (Noerr-Pennington activity admissible only to extent it tends to show pur-
pose or character of other non-exempt activity); Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Moham-
mad, 586 F..2d 530, 543 n.7 (5th Cir. 1978) (admissibility should be governed by weighing
probative value of plaintiff's need for evidence against the potential for prejudice of defend-
ant's First Amendment rights); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 538 F.
Supp. 1257, 1278-79 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (allowing plaintiff to initiate inquiry designed solely
to trigger admission of Noerr-Pennington conduct would have "chilling effect" upon the
exercise of First Amendment rights).
Analogizing speech that is not protected by the First Amendment to the "sham" excep-
tion to Noerr-Pennington immunity has met with other criticism. See Balmer, supra note
32, at 60-62. While such "constitutional analysis . . . suggests that the first amendment
protects litigation from antitrust liability to the same extent that speech is protected from
government restriction," it offers little help in determining the First Amendment value of
the right to petition in light of statutory antitrust policies. See id.
5' See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See Australia/Eastern, 537 F. Supp. at 810-11; supra notes 53-57 and accompanying
text (discussing Australia/Eastern)
Go See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (Australia/Eastern court placed
higher value on First Amendment interests than Carolina Power court); see also Columbia
Pictures Indus. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, 944 F.2d 1525, 1531 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert granted, 112 S. Ct. 1557 (1992) ("sham" exception to Noerr-Pennington must be ap-
plied with caution to avoid chilling effect on First Amendment petitioning).
e See Australia/Eastern, 537 F. Supp. at 810.
62 See id. at 811. However, the court importantly held that failure to show an "actual"
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HI. DETERMINATION OF A COMPELLING INTEREST IN DISCLOSURE
An appropriate set of guidelines for determining the discover-
ability of Noerr-Pennington material was recently applied by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
in P. & B. Marina, Ltd. Partnership v. Logrande.6 3 The P. & B.
Marina court confirmed that, while Noerr-Pennington protection
did not extend to discovery, the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment may, in certain cases, establish a qualified privilege
with regard to documents produced within the scope of the doc-
trine.6 The court held that where such a First Amendment inter-
est is present, the party seeking discovery must assert a compelling
interest of its own. 5 In determining whether a compelling interest
in discovery exists, a court must ask three questions: 1) whether
the documents are relevant;66 2) whether the documents are criti-
cal to the complainants' claims;6 7 and 3) whether the documents
are obtainable from any other source. 8
Once a compelling interest in obtaining discovery is estab-
lished, a court theoretically affords it equal status with the com-
peting First Amendment concerns, leaving the trial court to deter-
mine the dominant interest on a case-by-case basis.6 9  By
chilling effect did not automatically mandate disclosure. Id. Rather, a showing of "actual"
chill tended to weigh the balance in favor of First Amendment values. Id.
83 136 F.R.D. 50, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). In P. & B. Marina, plaintiff marina owners filed
suit under various federal and state laws, claiming in part that defendant association and
the Town of Islip conspired to deprive plaintiff of ownership of plaintiff's marina. Id. at 52.
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants had instigated "sham" legislative, executive,
administrative, and judicial proceedings for the sole purpose of wresting control of plaintiff's
business. Id. at 61. Defendants claimed immunity from suit under Noerr-Pennington, id. at
52, and refused to comply with plaintiff's request for discovery of certain documents on
several grounds, including: attorney-client privilege, id. at 53; work product immunity, id. at
53, 57; and the First Amendment right of petition, id. at 59.
6 Id. at 52-53.
'6 Id. at 61.
Id. (citations omitted). The court held that inquiry into the intentions of defendants
was relevant to plaintiff's allegations of "sham" abuse of governmental process. Id. at 61-62.
67 Id. Without distinguishing that which is relevant from that which is critical, the
court held that it was critical "for plaintiffs to inquire into the intentions of the association
regarding the marina." Id.
68 Id. at 61. The court's finding that the information sought was only available from the
defendants themselves completed the inquiry and firmly established that plaintiffs had a
compelling interest in obtaining discovery. Id. at 62.
so See id. at 61-63. The court's requirement that a complainant must assert a compel-
ling interest in obtaining disclosure before the trier of fact may resort to balancing the com-
peting interests implicitly recognizes that the resultant balancing can favor either interest,
and that the facts of each case will be determinative of the outcome. Id.
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implementing this three step analysis, a court will protect a peti-
tioning party from absolute discovery of all relevant evidence.7°
Materials that are requested "merely to satisfy curiosity or to serve
some general end, such as public interest," will not be discoverable
because such an interest alone will not meet the "compelling"
standard.7 1 Consequently, it seems that parties contemplating
some type of petitioning activity will not be apprehensive to peti-
tion for fear that extensive discovery demands will be placed on
them.
CONCLUSION
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects the First Amend-
ment right of petition by creating an exemption from antitrust lia-
bility for genuine attempts to petition the government. Although a
litigant in an antitrust suit may not claim immunity from discov-
ery based solely on Noerr-Pennington protection, the fundamental
right of petition itself may be the source of a qualified privilege
from discovery. Once a litigant alleges that allowing discovery
would have a chilling effect on his or her First Amendment right of
petition, the court must determine if there is a compelling need for
disclosure of the documents sought. If a compelling interest in dis-
covery exists, the court may then proceed to balance the competing
interests based on the facts before it. Thus, while Noerr-Pen-
nington documents may be excluded from discovery, it is the Peti-
tion Clause of the First Amendment, and not the doctrine itself,
upon which such exclusion may be properly based.
Alan S. Golub
70 Id. at 61.
71 Australia/Eastern, 537 F. Supp. 807, 810.
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